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Abstract—Spurred by the development of cloud computing, there has been considerable recent interest in the Database-as-a-Service
(DaaS) paradigm. Users lacking in expertise or computational resources can outsource their data and database management needs to
a third-party service provider. Outsourcing, however, raises an important issue of result integrity: how can the client verify with
lightweight overhead that the query results returned by the service provider are correct (i.e., the same as the results of query execution
locally)? This survey focuses on categorizing and reviewing the progress on the current approaches for result integrity of SQL query
evaluation in the DaaS model. The survey also includes some potential future research directions for result integrity verification of the
outsourced computations.
Index Terms—Database-as-a-Service, SQL query, result integrity verification.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The amount spent by corporations, non-profit organizations,
and government agencies in implementing and supporting
data management and analytics is considerable. Globally
3500 enterprises spend, on average, $664,000 annually on
data management [75]. Due to the fast growth of data vol-
umes, the scale of data management systems is increasingly
crossing the petabyte barrier [11], [22], [50]. Unfortunately,
the ability of organizations to support effective and efficient
data management typically lags behind their ability to col-
lect and store the data. The solution of in-house data analyt-
ics software is not satisfactory, as it either may not be able to
address users’ specific data analysis needs or fail to deliver
data management services that are easily deployable. On the
other hand, hiring in-house data management professionals
is not affordable by small and medium-sized organizations
that have limited financial budget.
Explosive development of the Internet and advances
in networking technology have fueled a new computing
paradigm called Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) [37]. In the
DaaS paradigm, the clients who own large volumes of
data but lack resources to do data management themselves
outsource their data as well as the data analysis to a third-
party database service provider. The service provider offers
adequate hardware, software, and network resources to host
the clients’ databases, and provides technical supports of
data management services, including data access, query
processing, and dealing with updates. Several industrial
organizations such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft are
providing cloud-based database services in various forms.
For example, Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides compu-
tation capacity and data storages via Amazon Elastic Com-
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pute Cloud (EC2) [1] and Simple Storage Service (S3) [2].
Google provides Cloud SQL [4], a fully-managed database
service for relational PostgreSQL and MySQL databases.
Microsoft provides cloud database services [8] on Azure
cloud [10]. By using these services, the clients can exploit
the benefit of mass storage, accelerated processing capacity,
and sophisticated data management and analytics at a low
cost.
Outsourcing database management to a computationally
powerful service provider enables to achieve sophisticated
analysis on large volumes of data in a cost effective way.
With this architecture, however, the client no longer has
direct control over the outsourced data and computations.
Without any security guarantee from the service provider,
clients have little faith in the security of the received out-
sourced services. One of the important security issues of
DaaS paradigm is the result integrity of the outsourced
computations. In many DaaS paradigms, the client typically
has a pay-per-use arrangement with the service provider,
where the service provider charges the client proportional
to the effort involved in the computations. However, the
service providers in practice rarely provide sufficient details
of the computation efforts that are charged for service fees1.
Due to the lack of transparency in the current outsourcing
services, the service provider is incentivized to improve its
revenue by computing with less resource while charging for
more. As an example, project managers from SETI@home
[9], a well-known volunteer computing grid, have report-
edly [42] uncovered attempts by some users to forge the
amount of time they have donated in order to move up
on the Web listings of top contributors. Indeed, the director
for SETI@home is quoted [42] saying that such cheaters
comprise roughly 1% of their users. Besides cheating on
1. Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [1] charges the users by the
number of computing hours and the size of transferred data. It does
not provide any detail of the involved computations (e.g., bandwidth,
computing cycles, etc.) in the bills. Many online discussions [5], [6] have
revealed that there are hidden service fees related to the computation



















2computations, there are many other reasons that a service
provider may return incorrect query results. For instance,
the data or the computations may be corrupted due to
malware or security break-ins. Or a malicious insider (e.g.,
a disgruntled employee) could modify the program and/or
the query results. Given the fact that many data analytics
applications (e.g., fraud detection and business intelligence)
are mission critical, it is important to provide efficient and
practical methods to enable the client to verify whether the
service provider returned correct results of the outsourced
database services.
Intuitively, the general-purpose protocols for verifiable
computations [32], [64] can support the verification of any
arbitrary query. However, due to the generality, these ap-
proaches can incur excessive proof construction overhead at
the server side [60]. In the last two decades, a large variety
of efficient authentication methods have been proposed for
specific types of SQL queries. A brief survey of a subset of
these methods was presented in [13]. In this survey article,
we will give a comprehensive overview of the existing
approaches for result integrity authentication of the DaaS
paradigm. By doing the survey, we hope to provide a useful
resource for both database and security communities.
The rest of the survey is organized as follows. Section
2 overviews the DaaS framework, the integrity verification
goals, and a categorization of the existing authentication
methods for SQL query evaluation. Section 3 presents two
authenticated data structures that are popularly used in
authentication. Section 4 introduces the cryptographic back-
ground of a set of authentication approaches. Section 5
discusses the existing authentication techniques that return
deterministic integrity guarantees of the result correctness.
Section 6 presents the methods that can return probabilistic
integrity guarantee. Section 7 discusses the existing au-
thentication methods that verify result freshness. Section 8
presents the works that consider result integrity with ad-
ditional security features (e.g., access control and privacy).
Finally, Section 9 concludes the survey and discusses the
possible research directions.
2 OVERVIEW
In this section, we overview the preliminaries of the survey.
We also provide a categorization of the existing authentica-
tion methods for outsourced SQL query evaluation.
2.1 Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) Paradigm
The concept of the database-as-a-service (DaaS) paradigm is
first defined in [37]. A typical database-as-a-service (DaaS)
paradigm consists of three entities: (1) the data owner who
possesses a large collection of records D. Due to the lack
of resources, the data owner outsources D to a service
provider; (2) the service provider (SP) who provides storage
and data management services for the clients; and (3) the
client who sends queries to SP. SP executes the queries on the
outsourced data, and returns the query results to the client.
The client may have limited computational power (e.g., she
may launch the verification on mobile devices). The data
owner and the client may be the same entity. In this survey,
we mainly focus on relational databases and SQL queries,
including range queries, joins, and aggregate queries.
2.2 Verification Goal
One of the serious concerns of the DaaS paradigm is that
the SP may return incorrect query evaluation results, due
to various reasons such as server errors or external com-
promise [81]. The goal of result integrity authentication is
to enable the client to verify that for any query Q, if the
results R returned by SP is the same as by executing Q
on the dataset D locally, i.e., if R = Q(D). There are
four different authentication goals: authenticity, soundness,
completeness, and freshness.
• Authenticity. The results R must be generated from
the outsourced dataset D and not being tampered
with.
• Soundness. All the records in R must satisfy Q.
Intuitively, the soundness of R can be measured by




The query is sound if precision is 1.
• Completeness. R must include all records that sat-





The query is complete if recall is 1.
• Freshness. When there are updates on the out-
sourced dataset D, the query Q must be executed
against the latest data records, rather than out-of-
date versions. The returned results R only includes
the records from the latest dataset.
2.3 A Categorization of Integrity Authentication Tech-
niques
In this survey, we categorize the existing result integrity
authentication approaches into two types, based on the
verification guarantee that these approaches can return:
• The deterministic approaches that verify the query
results with 100% certainty.
• The probabilistic approaches that return a probabilis-
tic verification guarantee of the query results.
2.3.1 Deterministic Authentication
Consider the query Q and its results R, all deterministic
authentication solutions rely on proofs of the query results to
return a deterministic integrity guarantee. Intuitively, besides
the query results R, the SP constructs a short proof of R, and
sends both the proof and R to the client. The proof some-
times is referred as the verification object (VO). The client
utilizes the proof to verify that R satisfies certain require-
ments (e.g., soundness, completeness, and freshness). At a
high level, most of the proof-based authentication methods
follow the similar procedure below. Before sending the
datasetD to the SP, the data owner computes some auxiliary
informationA ofD, which is known as an authentication data
structure (ADS). Normally the ADS A is much smaller than
D. The data owner sends both D and A to the SP, while
keeping A locally. She may distribute certain information to
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Query Type Verification Goal Authentication Method
UpdateRange Join Agg. A S C F Deterministic Approach Probabilistic ApproachTree Sign. Acc. Hardware Checkpoint Interactive-proof
[25] X X X X X X
[78] X X X X X
[51], [58], [61] X X X X X X
[44] X X X X X X X
[45] X X X X X X X
[56] X X X X X
[52] X X X X X
[53], [57] X X X X X X X
[59] X X X X X X X X
[21] X X X X X
[77] X X X
[83] X X X X X X X X
[60] X X X X X X
[82] X X X X X X X X
[13] X X X X X X X X
[68] X X X X X X X
[24], [26] X X X X X
[76] X X X X X X X
[81] X X X X X X X X
TABLE 1
Summary of existing approaches (A: authenticity; S: soundness; C: completeness; F : freshness)
Fig. 1. An example of proof-based authentication method (Steps 1, 2
and 3: Verification preparation phase; Steps I, II, III and IV: Verification
phase)
the clients. When a client sends a query Q to the SP, the
SP executes Q on D, and constructs a proof of the query
results R, by using both R and the auxiliary information A
obtained from the data owner. The SP sends both the query
results and the proof to the client. The client verifies result
integrity by using both the proof and the certain information
that the data owner shared with her. Figure 1 illustrates the
framework of the proof-based authentication methods.
Based on how the proof is constructed, we categorize
the proof-based methods into four types, namely tree-based
solutions, signature-based solutions, accumulation value based
solutions, and trusted hardware based solutions.
In the tree-based solutions the ADS normally takes the
tree format. As part of query execution, the SP traverses the
ADS tree and gathers the information of respective nodes
to form the proof. From the query results and the proof,
the client re-constructs the traversal path used in query
execution and verifies that it is indeed authentic.
By the signature-based methods, the data owner signs
individual tuples in a chain fashion before uploading her
dataset to the SP. During query execution, the SP gathers the
signatures of the tuples in the query results, and compresses
these signatures into an aggregated one. The aggregated
signature constructed from the authenticated chain forms
the proof of the query results. The client can authenticate
the results by utilizing the signatures of the tuples in the
results and the aggregated signature in the proof.
The accumulation value based solutions are adapted
from the cryptographic techniques that authenticate a num-
ber of set operations (e.g., intersection, set difference, and
set summation). These techniques perform set authentica-
tion by constructing a proof of set operation results using
accumulation values. The set authentication protocols are
then used as building blocks for verification of particular
SQL operations (e.g., multi-range selection, join, and aggre-
gation).
The trusted hardware based solutions rely on some
tamper-proof, trusted hardware that is deployed on the
untrusted server. The original query will be rewritten into
sub-queries. All sub-queries that cannot be authenticated are
processed inside the trusted hardware, while the results of
the remaining sub-queries are verified by other authentica-
tion methods, e.g., the tree-based authentication methods.
2.3.2 Probabilistic Authentication
The probabilistic authentication methods return a probabilis-
tic result integrity guarantee (i.e., how likely the returned
4results are correct given that they passed the verification).
The existing probabilistic authentication methods can be
classified into two types: (1) the checkpoint-based solutions,
and (2) the interactive-proof based solutions.
The checkpoint-based solutions rely on checkpoints for
verification. Unlike the proof-based authentication methods
that require the SP to construct the proofs of the query re-
sults, the checkpoint-based authentication does not require
the involvement of the SP. The key idea of the checkpoint-
based authentication is to verify if the returned query re-
sults include some particular checkpoints (i.e., some specific
records). If the results fail the verification based on those
checkpoints, the client can determine that the results fail
the authentication with 100% certainty. Otherwise, the client
believes that the results pass authentication with some prob-
abilistic guarantee. Most of the checkpoint-based methods
construct the checkpoints by inserting counterfeit records F
into the dataset D before outsourcing. The assumption is
that SP cannot distinguish the real and counterfeit tuples
easily. Then for any given query Q, a faithful SP should
return Q(F ) as the part of query results. Thus, any query
result that does not include Q(F ) can be caught as incorrect.
The interactive proof based solutions extends the
information-theoretic interactive proof system [23] to SQL
query authentication. The key idea is to translate SQL
queries into arithmetic circuits, and verify if the outputs
of these circuits are correct. Since the interactive-proof pro-
tocol can incur expensive communication and verification
overhead, the verification methods takes a random input
for the last step of interactive proof protocol, making the au-
thentication method associated with a probabilistic integrity
guarantee.
3 AUTHENTICATED DATA STRUCTURE (ADS)
In this section, we introduce two prevalent ADS structures,
namely, Merkle hash tree (MHT) and Merkle B-tree (MB-
tree), that are used by a number of existing ADS-based
verification methods.
3.1 Merkle Hash Tree (MHT)
One of the widely-used ADS structures is Merkle Hash tree
(MHT) [65]. A MHT T is a tree in which each leaf node
N stores the digest of a tuple t: hN = H(t), where H()
is a one-way, collision-resistant hash function (e.g. SHA-1
[31]). For each internal node N of T , it is assigned the value
hN = H(hN1 || . . . ||hNz ), where N1, . . . , Nz are the children
of N , and || is the concatenation operator. The hash value
hroot of the root node is used as the digest of the tree. To
serve the authentication purpose, a trusted party (can be
the data owner himself) generates the signature of the ADS
as Sig = Enc(sk, hroot), where Enc() is an asymmetric
encryption function, and sk is the private key. Sig is shared
with the clients for authentication. Figure 2 illustrates an
example of MHT.
3.2 Merkle B-tree (MB-tree)
Merkle B-tree (MB-tree) [44] enables efficient search on one-
dimensional data, as it combines MHT withB+-tree. In MB-
tree, the tuples are arranged in the same fashion as standard
B+-tree. The major difference is the incorporation of hash
Fig. 2. An example of Merkle-tree
values in the tree nodes. In particular, in the leaf node, each
entry is associated with a hash value h = H(t), where t is
the tuple in the entry. In the internal node, every pointer to
a child node is combined with h = H(h1|| . . . ||hk), where
h1, . . . hk are the hash values in the child node.
4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
In this section, we present the cryptographic background of
the signature-based and accumulation value based verifica-
tion methods.
4.1 Bilinear Pairing
Bilinear pairing [49] uses a pairing between two crypto-
graphic groups to a third group with a mapping. In partic-
ular, let G and GT be two groups of order p (with p a λ-bit
prime), a bilinear pairing on (G,GT ) is a map e : G×G→ GT
that satisfies the following conditions:
• Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Zp, P,Q ∈ G, e(P a, Qb) =
e(P,Q)ab;
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1, where g ∈ G is a
generator of group G;
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e.
4.2 Aggregate Signature
An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature that
supports aggregation. Informally, given n signatures on n
distinct messages, all these signatures are aggregated into a
single short signature [18].
4.2.1 BGLS Scheme
The BGLS [18] aggregate signature scheme (named after its
four authors) relies on bilinear pairing for signature aggre-
gation. In particular, given a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT
over two groups of prime order p, let s ∈ Zp be a secret key,
the public key v is generated as
v = gs ∈ G, (1)
5where g is the generator of group G. For any message mi,
let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a full-domain hash function. The
signature σi of mi is generated as
σi = H(mi)
s. (2)
Clearly, σi ∈ G.
Given n signatures {σ1, . . . , σn} where σi = H(mi)si ,




Again, σ1,n is a member in group G.
Upon receiving an aggregate signature σ1,n, the set of
messages {mi}, and the public keys {vi}, whether σ1,n
corresponds to the messages {mi} can be verified by first
computing hi = H(mi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The messages are
accepted if
e(σ1,n, g) = Π
n
i=1e(hi, vi). (4)
4.2.2 Homomorphic Linear Authentication (HLA) Scheme
Homomorphic Linear Authentication (HLA) scheme [12]
allows to check the authenticity of the messages against
the generated aggregate signature without the knowledge
of individual messages. The HLA scheme consists of the
following algorithms:
• (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(1`): given a security parameter
`, this algorithm outputs a pair of public and private
keys (sk, pk).
• σi ← TagGen(sk,mi): for message mi, this algo-
rithm generates a signature σi based on the private
key sk.
• σ1,n ← HLAAgg(~c, ~Tag): this linear aggregation al-
gorithm takes the input of a vector of coefficients ~c =
{c1, . . . , cn} and a vector of tags ~Tag = {σ1, . . . , σn}
with respect to a vector of messages ~m = {m1,




• {0, 1} ← V rfy(pk,m′, σ1,n): given the input as
the public key pk, a candidate message m′ and an
aggregate signature σ1,n, this algorithm returns 1 if
σ1,n is valid with respect to m′, and 0 otherwise.
4.3 Accumulation Value
An accumulator scheme [14], [15] allows aggregation of a
large set of inputs into one constant-size value. Papaman-
thou et al. [63] proposed an accumulation value scheme
for set operation verification. In particular, given a set of





where g is the generator of a bilinear group, and s is a
randomly chosen secret value.
For any pair of subsets S1 and S2 of S such that: (1)
S1 ∪ S2 = S; and (2) |S1| + |S2| = |S|, it must be true that
e(acc(S1), acc(S2)) = e(acc(S), g), where e is the bilinear
pairing function. Based on the discrete log assumption [69],
it is NP-hard for any polynomial-time adversary without the
knowledge of the secret key s to find a different set S3 6= S2
such that e(acc(S1), acc(S3)) = e(acc(S), g).
4.4 Verification Protocols for Set Operations
4.4.1 Set Intersection
Given a collection of sets S = {S1, . . . , St}, I = S1 ∩ S2 ∩
· · · ∩ St is the correct intersection of S if and only if:
• I ⊆ S1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊆ St (subset condition);
• (S1−I)∩· · ·∩(St−I) = ∅ (completeness condition).
Papamanthou et al. proposed a set intersection verifi-
cation protocol to verify that I is a correct intersection of
S [63]. For each set Si, the SP demonstrates I ⊆ Si by
providing acc(Wi), where Wi = Si − I , and acc() is the
function that calculates the accumulation value (Equation 5).
If e(acc(I), acc(Wi)) = e(acc(Si), g) for every set Si, where
e is the bilinear pairing, the client is assured that the subset
condition is met. The intersection completeness is proved by
finding a set of polynomials of s, namely {q1, . . . , qt}, such
that
∑t




Papadopoulos et al. [60] designed a method for efficient
authentication of set difference results based on the accu-
mulation values. In particular, given two sets X1 and X2
such that X2 ⊆ X1, to demonstrate X = X1 \ X2, the
prover constructs acc(X) (Equation 5). The verifier simply
checks e(acc(X2), acc(X)
?
= e(acc(X1), g) for verification,
where e is the bilinear pairing, and acc() is the function that
calculates the accumulation value (Equation 5).
4.4.3 Summation over Sets
Given a set S = {x1, . . . , xn}, Zhang et al. [82] proposed
the sum verification protocol based on accumulation values
to check if sum ?=
∑n




i + s) =
ans
n + · · · + a1s + a0. Obviously,
∑n
i=1 xi = a1/a0. Based
on this reasoning, the prover provides a0, a1, as well as
proof that they are the coefficients of the smallest exponent
in M(S), for the purpose of verification.
5 DETERMINISTIC AUTHENTICATION AP-
PROACHES
In this section, we overview the authentication approaches
that use verification object (VO) for authentication. There
are three different methods to construct VO: (1) use the au-
thenticated data structure; (2) use signature aggregation and
chaining; and (3) use cryptographic accumulation values.
All these methods return a deterministic integrity guarantee
(i.e., with 100% certainty). Besides these three methods,
we also discuss the verification method that relies on the
trusted hardware to return deterministic guarantee. Next,
we discuss each of these four different methods respectively.
5.1 Tree-based Authentication
Quite a few existing authentication approaches use the au-
thenticated data structure (ADS) to construct the verification
objects. Most of these works use different variants of Merkle
hash tree (MHT) for specific query types.
Devanbu et al. [25] is one of the first works that use
MHT to verify inclusiveness (i.e., soundness) and complete-
ness of SQL query evaluation. They use Merkle hash tree
(MHT) to construct the ADS. During query execution, the
6Fig. 3. Illustration of MHT-based Verification [25]
SP traverses the MHT and gathers the respective nodes in
the MHT to construct the VO. For instance, given a single-
dimensional range query Q, the VO includes the lowest
common ancestor in MHT that cover the tuples in Q and
their nearest lower/upper bound nodes, as well as the nodes
in the proximity subtrees that contain the boundary nodes
occurring consecutively to the smallest (largest) element of
Q. Consider the Merkle tree in Figure 3 as an example.
Assume the leaf nodes (colored gray) N6 and N7 falls in the
query range. The nearest lower (upper, resp.) bound node
is N5 (N8, resp). For VO construction, the SP identifies: (1)
node N58, which is the lowest common ancestor of nodes
N6 and N7; and (2) the proximity trees that include N58 and
the two paths from N58 to N5 and to N8. The SP includes
the hash value of N58 and the proximity trees in VO. The
authenticity of Q can be verified by re-constructing the root
hash of N58 using the hash values of N5 - N8, which are
included in VO. The completeness of Q can be verified
via the proximity sub-trees in VO. Devanbu et al. [25] also
considered other types of SQL queries, including projection,
join, set union and intersection. The key idea is similar to
the verification of selection queries. We omit the details for
these types of queries. Given a dataset D that contains n
tuples and a query Q whose result contains t data points,
the VO size of Q by [25] is O(t+ log2(n)).
One weakness of [25] is that the VO size depends on
the size of the query answers and the outsourced dataset.
To eliminate this dependence on data and query size, Pang
et al. [58] designed a new ADS named verifiable B-tree (VB-
tree). VB-tree is similar to MB-tree (Section 3.2). It constructs
a Merkle hash tree on top of the B+-tree by adding the
digests on every B-tree node. The digests are computed
using a cumulative and commutative hash function. For
the VO construction, the SP identifies the smallest subtree
(called enveloping tree) in VB-tree that covers all the tuples
in the query results. For a given range selection query, the
VO of the selection results includes: (1) the signed digest for
the node at the root of the smallest subtree (called enveloping
tree) in VB-tree that covers all the result tuples of the query;
and (2) the signed digest for each node in the enveloping
subtree that represents those branches that do not overlap
the result. The result verification is similar to [25]; the client
tries to re-construct the signed digest of the root of the VB-
tree, and matches it with the local copy that is shared by
the data owner. Unlike [25] whose VO contains the digests
all the way to the root of the tree index, the VO of [58]
only needs to contain proofs for the smallest subtree that
envelops the query result. Therefore, the VO size grows
linearly with the size of the query results, but is independent
of the data size. However, VB-tree cannot be used for the
verification of result completeness.
Fig. 4. An example of HAT (la(v) (resp. ra(v)) denotes the least
command ancestor of left (resp. right) adjacent nodes of v)
Although VB-tree [58] eliminates the complexity depen-
dency on data size, it may suffer from the strong assumption
that the SP must be trusted to some degree [56]. Further-
more, VB-tree uses a one-way function based on modular
exponentiation, which was shown infeasible to handle large
answer sizes [56]. Therefore, [56] proposed a new ADS
named Hybrid Authentication Tree (HAT), which incorporates
fast hash functions with an efficient RSA based one-way
quasi-commutative accumulator [15]. A HAT is a binary
search tree with data stored at the leaves, along with a
digest procedure that incorporates a fast collision intractable
hash function and an accumulator. In HAT, the hash values
of the leaf nodes are generated by applying the standard
hash function on the data values, while the hash values
of the internal nodes incorporate the hash values from the
lowest common ancestors of all left and right adjacent nodes
respectively. The final digest value of the HAT tree is com-
7puted as the accumulator of the hash of all the nodes along
with the root hash. Given a range query [a, b], SP returns all
data items in the range and two boundary leaves in HAT.
The verification is based on the concept of covering nodes,
which is a set of nodes with disjoint HAT subtrees whose
leaves are the exact answer to the range query. The verifica-
tion method utilizes the fact that if the two covering nodes
vR and vL are adjacent, then their leaf nodes are continuous
and no values are missing between the two boundary values
of the range [a, b]. This is verified by computing the hash
values of internal nodes as well as the accumulator proof
of the covering nodes and their immediate adjacent left
and right nodes returned by SP. Finally, the client checks
if the digest of root of the HAT matches the local copy
shared by the data owner. Take Figure 4 as an example.
The leaf nodes in gray color denote the query results. VL
and VR denote the two covering nodes. The SP generates
the regular hash value by using the hash function f1() and
the accumulate hash value by using the hash function f2().
Given a query Q, besides the query results, the SP returns
the VO that consists of the following information: (1) the
nearest lower/upper bound nodes (denoted in black color);
(2) the two accumulation values f2(root) excludes the digest
of f2(VL) and f2(VR) respectively, (3) the digest values that
are needed to reconstruct f1(VL) and f1(VR); and (4) the
digest values that are needed to reconstruct f2(VL) and
f2(VR). The digest values of the nodes in red (blue, resp.)
color circle outline are returned (computed, resp.) by the
SP (the client, resp.). With those digest values, the client first
verifies that VL and VR are adjacent by checking if the digest
of ra(VL) equals to the digest of la(VR). Then it checks if the
two accumulation values together with f1(VL) and f1(VR)
can reconstruct f2(root).
Fig. 5. An example of EMB-Tree Node [44]
So far the existing works mainly consider static scenar-
ios, where owners never issue data updates. Li et al. [44]
are one of the first work that designs dynamic ADS for
query authentication. They design three ADS structures,
namely, the Aggregated Signatures with B+-trees (ASB-tree),
the Merkle B-tree (MB-tree), and the embedded MB-tree
(EMB-tree). The ASB-tree is a B+-tree whose leaf nodes
contain hash values that are constructed from the consec-
utive pairs of tuples. For example, for the leaf node whose
entry corresponds to the tuple ri, assume the consecutive
tuple of ri is rj , based on some sorted order on a given
attribute. Then ri corresponds to a leaf node in the ASB-
tree, which is associated with a pair (ri, si), where si =
S(ri|rj) (| denotes some canonical pairing of strings that
can be uniquely parsed back into its two components).
Chaining tuples in this way enables to verify that there
are no tuples missing in-between the lower/upper bound
node. The MB-tree has been discussed in Section 3.2. An
EMB-tree consists of regular B+-tree entries augmented
with an embedded MB-tree. Each EMB-tree node consists
of a triplet (ki, pi, hi), where ki is key of the node, pi is
the pointer to the embedded Merkle tree at this node, and
hi is the hash value of the embedded tree. An example of
EMB-trees is shown in Figure 5. When there are updates
on the data, only the path from the affected leaf (i.e., the
updated data tuple) to the root is updated. The VO con-
struction and query authentication procedure based on the
EMB-tree is similar to [25]. Besides the design of the EMB-
tree structure, [44] conducted the analysis of some existing
approaches, including the aggregated signatures for B+-
trees, the Merkle B-tree, and the EMB-trees, over all six
metrics: (1) the computation overhead for the owner, (2)
the owner-SP communication cost, (3) the storage overhead
for the SP, (4) the computation overhead for the SP, (5) the
client-SP communication cost, and (6) the computation cost
for the client. The experimental results show that, the ASB-
tree has the highest construction cost, the most expensive
VO construction cost and verification cost. But it has the
smallest VO size. The Merkle B-tree has the largest VO size,
but the cheapest verification cost and update cost. The EMB-
tree achieves a good compromise between ADS construction
overhead and verification cost.
Most of the existing works discussed so far mainly
focus on range queries. Yang et al. [78] initiated the in-
vestigation of result authentication of join operations. They
proposed three authenticated join algorithms depending on
the ADS availability: (1) Authenticated Indexed Sort Merge
Join (AISM), which utilizes a single ADS in one of the base
relations, (2) Authenticated Index Merge Join (AIM) that
requires an ADS for both relations, and (3) Authenticated
Sort Merge Join (ASM), which does not rely on any ADS.
Consider the join of two tablesR and S on the attribute(s) J .
The AISM algorithm relies on the MB-tree and the ranked-
list for authentication of join results of R and S. In the
pre-processing step, the outer table R is sorted on the join
attribute J , with the output as a rank list. The rank list
outputs the verifiable order by which the client follows to
verify the signature of records in the results. Given a set of
recordsR′ ⊆ R, the query of finding the join records ofR′ in
S is equivalent to a single range query Q = σclJcuS, where
cl and cu are the lower- and upper- bound value of R′ on
the join attribute J . The result of the range query evaluation
(and thus the join results) can be authenticated by utilizing
the MB-tree [44] of S as the ADS. The query authentication
8method is similar to [25]. In order to save communication
cost, the AIM algorithm constructs two MB-trees for R and
S respectively. Based on the two MB-trees TR and TS , the SP
alternatively searches the matching tuples on each ADS and
prepares the VO. ASM method does not require any ADS at
all. It sorts the data values of the join attributes J of R and
S as two rank list respectively. Then the two sorted tables
R′ and S′ are merged as a single rank list, with the records
that can be joined marked. Then it creates a bitmap BR, in
which the bit of the records of R that have join partners
in S is set as 1, otherwise 0. Both signatures of R and |R|,
and BR are added to VO. The same process repeats for S.
The client verifies the result by checking the bitmap values
of the received results with VO. Compared with AISM and
AIM, ASM is less efficient as it does not utilize any ADS.
However, this also brings flexibility for authentication of
complex queries such as multi-way joins.
Li et al. [45] extend the study to aggregation queries.
They consider both static and dynamic cases for query au-
thentication. For the static case, first, they show that authen-
ticating SUM queries is equivalent to authenticating prefix
sums [38]. To authenticate prefix sum, Li et al. designed a
new ADS structure named the authenticated prefix sums tree
(APS-tree), which takes the format of of a multi-way Merkle
hash tree, in which each leaf entry is converted into a base-
f number. To construct the VO of a given query Q, the SP
returns the 2d corner prefix sum values as the part of VO,
where d is the number of dimensions of the dataset. Besides,
the VO contains the hash values of the APS-tree nodes that
are needed to authenticate the sum results, as well as the
encoding of the path for each node. Based on the VO, the
client can authenticate the query result by authenticating
each of the 2d elements of the answer set by computing the
hash of the root for each path and then comparing it with
the local signature generated by the data owner.
The APS-tree only can be used for static databases. It
cannot work well for dynamic settings as it may lead to
high querying cost. Therefore, Li et al. [45] designed another
ADS named authenticated aggregation B-tree (AAB-tree) for
the dynamic case. The AAB-tree is an MB-tree with each
node associated with an aggregate value as the sum of the
aggregate values of its children, and a hash value over the
concatenation of both the hash values and the aggregate
values of the children. An example of AAB-tree node shows
in Figure 6. The AAB-tree can be used for authentication
of one-dimensional aggregate queries in a dynamic setting
since the owner can easily issue deletions, insertions and
updates to the tree, which handles them similarly to a
normal B+-tree. It can be easily extended to deal with the
multi-dimension aggregate queries in the similar way as the
APS-tree. Other than COUNT and AVG, AAB-tree supports
authentication of MIN and MAX as well, by replacing the
SUM aggregate in each entry with the MIN/MAX aggre-
gate.
Most of the existing ADS-based verification methods
involve the data owner into the verification setup for ADS
construction, which may not be feasible for the data owner
who may have limited computational resources. Further-
more, the VO is typically large, which may bring significant
communication overhead. To address these two drawbacks,
Stavros Papadopoulos et al. [61] separate authentication
Fig. 6. An example of AAB-tree node [45] (ki: value range; pi: pointer
to the children node; αi: aggregation of all children nodes; ηi: the node
digest.
from query execution by exploiting a trusted entity (TE).
The high-level idea is that the data owner sends her dataset
to TE. TE generates the digest of each record by using a
one-way, collusion-resistant hash function. When the client
receives the result of a range query from the SP, the client
sends the query to TE. TE evaluates the query on the dataset
received from the data owner, and produces a verification
token, which is constructed by applying the exclusive-OR
(XOR) operator on the digests of tuples in the query re-
sult. TE transmits the verification token to the client. The
client computes the XOR of the digests of the records in
the returned results by the SP, and matches it against the
verification token by TE. To facilitate the authentication
process, [61] includes the design of a new ADS named XOR
B-Tree (XB-Tree) that integrates the B-tree with XOR values.
The XB-tree is very similar to the B-tree; the difference is
that each entry of the XB-tree is associated with a bit string
that represents the results of XOR operator. An example of
XB-tree is shown in Figure 7. Search on the XB-tree and VO
construction are very similar to those on the MB-tree.
So far most of the techniques incorporate the Merkle
hash tree with a data index to construct ADS. As part
of query execution, the SP traverses the ADS and gathers
the respective nodes to form the VO. Mouratidis et al.
[51] designed a novel scheme called Partially Materialized
Digest scheme (PMD) that separates MHT from the data
index. Instead, it uses a main index (MI) for querying, and
a separate digest index (DI) for query authentication. The MI
is a standardB+-tree on key. Range queries are evaluated on
MI in the same way as on the B+-tree. The DI is constructed
as follows. First, for each leaf MI node Ei, a lower MHT
is built on top of it. Then the upper MHT is built over
the roots of the lower trees. The root of the upper tree is
signed with the owner’s private key. Similar to [25], for a
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given range query Q, besides the records that satisfy the
range of Q, the SP identifies two boundary records, p and
p+, falling immediately to the left and to the right of the
query range. The VO is constructed by using the DI only. It
contains (1) the signed DI root, (2) all left sibling hashes to
the path of p, and (3) all right sibling hashes to the path of
p+. To verify if the received result is correct and complete,
the client combines RS with the components (2) and (3) of
VO to reconstruct the root of DI. If the signature of the root
of DI (i.e., component (1) of the VO) matches the locally
computed root hash, the result is correct and complete. By
separating these two indice, PMD significantly outperforms
the performance of MB-tree [44] in terms of query response
time, storage overhead and index construction cost.
5.2 Signature-based Authentication
An alternative verification approach is to generate the ver-
ification object in the format of a cryptographic signature.
Intuitively, using the signature of individual tuples only can
verify the authenticity of the returned tuples, i.e., if the tu-
ples indeed exist in the original dataset. To verify the sound-
ness and completeness of query results, a new integrity
authentication method that relies on signature aggregation for
VO construction is designed. The key idea is to generate
an authenticated chain from the signatures of tuples, and
outputs the aggregated signature of the authenticated chain
as the VO. In this section, we overview the works based on
signature aggregation.
Mykletun et al. [52] (appeared in 2004, published in 2006)
proposed the first signature-based method for range query
authentication. By their approach, the data owner constructs
a standard RSA signature [66] for each record, and sends
these signatures together with the dataset. The SP uses the
Condensed RSA to compress the RSA signatures [66] that
are associated with all records in the query results into a
single signature. The single signature then is sent to the
client together with the query results as its VO. The client
can verify the correctness and authenticity of the returned
query results by reconstructing the single signature from the
signatures of returned result tuples. The major advantage
of this method is that the VO size is significantly reduced
by combining multiple tuple signatures into a single signed
message.
Although effective, [52] cannot verify the completeness
of the query results. Narasimha et al. [53] extended [52] by
combining signature aggregation with signature chaining
for the authentication of range queries. Unlike [52] that
aggregates the signatures of individual tuples, [53] con-
structs the VO from the signature of each individual tuple
along with its immediate predecessor, i.e., sign(H(ti||ti−1),
where ti−1 is the immediate predecessor of ti on the search
attribute. By including the predecessor in the signature, it
forms a chain of tuples ordered on the search attribute.
By using the VO, the client verifies that the set of tuples
received in the result indeed form a valid chain.
Simultaneously, Pang et al. [57] devised a new signature-
based scheme for range and join queries. It constructs
the VO from the signature of each individual tuple along
with both of immediate predecessor and successor, i.e.,
sign(H(g(ti−1)||g(ti)||g(ti+1))), where ti−1 and ti+1 are the
immediate predecessor and successor of ti on the search
attribute respectively, sign is the digital signature signing
function (e.g., RSA or DSA [66]), H is the hash function,
|| is the concatenation operator, and g(ti) is the digest of
ti. The proposed scheme can support joins on primary key
and foreign key, by using signatures on the key attribute of
a relation to generate proof of the completeness of query
results from that relation.
One weakness of the signature aggregation approach
[57] is that it only supports single-dimension range queries
on the key attribute, since it requires the tuples to be
ordered based on their key attribute values. To address the
limitations of the signature chaining approaches in [57],
Cheng et al. [21] combined signature aggregation with a
data partitioning structure (e.g., R-tree [36] and KD-tree [16])
to support authentication of multi-dimensional range query
evaluation. Before outsourcing, the data owner constructs
an R-tree or KD-tree of the dataset to get data partitions.
Each partition P will be associated with a signature, which
is aggregated from the signatures of two auxiliary bounding
tuples of P . By including the signature of those partitions
that do not overlap with the query range, instead of the
records in these partitions, it reduces the VO size signifi-
cantly.
Zheng et al. [83] designed the signature-based authen-
tication for various types of queries, including aggregation
queries. It utilizes the Homomorphic Linear Authentication
(HLA) (Section 4.2.2) to construct the aggregate signature for
authentication of SUM queries. To support authentication
of other types of queries including range selection queries,
the authentication method combines HLA aggregation sig-
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nature with MB-tree [44], by associating the MB-tree entries
with the HLA aggregation signatures.
5.3 Accumulation Value based Verification
Most of the ADS-based authentication approaches share
one weakness for authentication of multi-dimensional range
queries: they require to construct one ADS for each possible
combination of dimensions in the database. This makes
the number of required ADS structures scales exponentially
with the number of dimensions. To address this weakness,
Papadopoulos et al. [60] integrate the accumulation values
with Merkle hash tree (MHT) for the authentication of
multidimensional range query evaluation on outsourced
databases. They use the authentication protocol of set inter-
section and difference (Section 4.4.2) as the building block.
The authentication method consists of two steps. Let R be
the query result. The first step is that the SP computes the
set of hash values Ri of the tuples that satisfy the query
on dimension i. It also computes the proof piRi that can be
used to verify that Ri is the set of tuples that match the
range constraint on dimension i. The second step is that
the SP computes R=
⋂
Rj and generates the proof pi of R.
The client uses the set intersection verification protocol on pi
(Section 4.4.2) to verify the correctness of R.
The verification scheme of [60] only supports the verifi-
cation of range queries. To address the limitation of [60],
Zhang et al. [82] proposed a verification system named
IntegriDB to accommodate a wide range of SQL queries,
including multi-dimensional range queries, JOIN, SUM,
MAX/MIN, COUNT, and AVG. The authors designed a
sum verification protocol (Section 4.4.3) and a new ADS
named Authenticated Interval Tree (AIT-tree), and facilitates
them as the key components of IntegriDB. The AIT-tree
is designed for key-value pairs. Given a set of key-value
pairs S = {(k, v)}, the AIT-tree is a binary-structured tree
constructed from S. For each key-value pair (k, v) ∈ S, it
corresponds to a leaf node in the AIT-tree, which stores a
triplet (k, v, h) with the hash value h = H(k||v). The leaf
nodes are arranged in the order of the keys. The value stored
at an internal node N corresponds to the accumulation
value (Section 4.4.3) of the leaves in the subtree rooted at
N . The verification of one-dimensional range query result is
similar to [25]. The verification of multi-dimensional range
queries and join queries is performed by the authentication
protocol of set intersection (Section 4.4.1), by considering
the results of each individual dimension/table as a set.
Regarding the aggregation queries, they are authenticated
by different methods. The SUM queries are verified by
using the set summation protocol (Section 4.4.3). In or-
der to facilitate the verification of COUNT operations, the
data owner creates an additional attribute A′j for each
attribute Aj . The value of A′j of the record ti is set as
ti[A
′
j ] = ti[Aj ]+1. The data owner constructs an AIT for the
new attributeAj′ . To prove the correctness ofCOUNT (Aj),
the SP prepares the proof for SUM(Aj) and SUM(Aj′),
as COUNT (Aj) = SUM(Aj′) − SUM(Aj). MAX/MIN
queries can be reduced to single-dimensional range queries.
In particular, let jmax be the maximum value for Aj that
is returned by the SP. The SP prepares the proof for the
range query σAj≥jmax(D). When there are data updates (i.e.,
insertion/deletion) on the dataset, the data owner updates
the AIT-tree by updating the corresponding leaf nodeN and
all the nodes on the path from N to the root of the AIT-tree,
as well as the accumulation values of all internal nodes on
this path.
5.4 Trusted Hardware based Verification
Most of the existing work discussed query verification
through software mechanisms. An alternative approach is
to rely on some tamper-proof, trusted hardware that is
deployed on the untrusted server. Sumeet Bajaj et al. [13] is
the only work that we are aware on using trusted hardware
for query authentication. They utilize the trusted hardware
such as the IBM 4764 [7] co-processor (SCPU) to provide
secure execution in an untrusted environment. The main
idea is to build MHT based ADS and store the root hash
of the ADS inside SCPU. This can eliminate the generation
of digital signatures of root node hash, thereby saving a
signature operation on each update, and signature verifica-
tions for each query. The original query will be rewritten
into sub-queries, ensuring that the processing within the
SCPU is minimized, and any intermediate results generated
by the SP can be validated by the SCPU using the ADS. Any
operation executed by the SP that cannot be authenticated
should be processed inside the SCPU. [13] provided the
query parsing scheme for various types of queries, including
range queries, projections, joins, aggregations, grouping and
ordering. When there is any data update, it leads to the
updates on the MHT based ADS used by the SCPU for
verification, which is modified only by the SCPU.
5.5 Dealing with Data Updates
For most of the existing deterministic authentication meth-
ods, the data owner is responsible to perform all update
operations on the data, and update the ADS according to
the updates. For the tree-based methods, one way to update
the ADS is to first update (insert, delete or modify) the
leaf nodes and their hash values. The root signature can
be updated by propagating the update on the leaf nodes
along their paths up to the root. The updates of both data
and ADS are sent back to the SP. In addition, the tree-based
approaches require the re-distribution of the digest of ADS
root signature to all clients. The naive approach for handling
batch updates would be to do all updates to the ADS one by
one and update the path from the leaves to the root once per
update. Obviously this naive method may lead to expensive
cost of performing unnecessary hash function computations
on the predecessor path when a large number of updates
affect a similar set of nodes (e.g., the same leaf). To optimize
the update cost on the ADS, [44] suggests to recompute the
hashes of all affected nodes only once, after all the updates
have been performed on the tree.
For the signature-based verification methods, any up-
date to a tuple requires to re-compute the signed digests
of the tuple as well as its neighboring ones. [54] provides
a detailed protocol to support updates on the digests. The
accumulation value based authentication methods deal with
updates in the similar way. When inserting/deleting a
record, the data owner needs to update the accumulation
values of these records [82].
When using the trusted hardware, the data owner can
issue an update query directly to the SCPU. All updates
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are then performed by the SCPU, and thus eliminating the
update overhead at the side of the data owner.
5.6 Discussion
One of the major concerns of the proof-based authentication
methods is the verification overhead, which includes the
size of the proof, the computational overhead in terms
of execution time to construct ADS and the VO, and the
verification time by the client. The tree-based, signature-
based and accumulation value based authentication meth-
ods require one-time setup. At the setup phase, the tree-
based methods have to construct ADS, while the signature-
based and the accumulation value based methods construct
the signatures/accumulation values of individual records.
The VO size of the tree-based methods is determined by
the size of the query results, which in turn increases both
query verification time and data communication overhead.
As shown in [20] the communication between the client and
SP (e.g., the cloud) can cost up to 3500 picocents/bit, 2-
3 orders of magnitude higher than processing costs (1 US
picocent = $1× 1014) [13]. On the other hand, the proof size
of the signature-based methods is a constant. Hence, they do
not incur the high transmission costs as the tree-based ap-
proaches. However, the construction of the signature-based
proofs is more expensive than the tree-based approaches,
since computing even a single cryptographic trapdoor re-
quires a high number of CPU cycles costing up to 30,000
picocents [13], [20].
6 PROBABILISTIC AUTHENTICATION METHODS
Unlike the authentication approaches that use proofs, the
authentication without using proofs only can return a
probabilistic integrity guarantee, i.e., how likely the re-
turned query results are sound and complete. The existing
probabilistic authentication methods can be classified into
two types: (1) the checkpoint-based solutions, and (2) the
interactive-proof based solutions.
6.1 Checkpoint-based Solutions
Sion [68] designed the first probabilistic verification ap-
proach for query execution on outsourced databases. Given
a batch of b queries {Q1, . . . , Qb}, the client first generates
r > 1 random numbers {x1, . . . , xr}, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ b.
Then, according to the random indexes, the client com-
putes the query results {ρ(Qx1), . . . ρ(Qxr )} for the picked
queries. For each query, it generates a challenge token
C(Qxi) = (H(||ρ(Qxi)), ), where  is randomly generated.
The client sends the query batch as well as the challenge
tokens to the SP. The SP returns the query results and the
query execution proof {x′1, . . . , x′r}. The results pass the
verification only if {x1, . . . , xr} matches {x′1, . . . , x′r}. Due
to the one-way non-invertible cryptographic hash function,
the SP has to execute the queries over the target dataset to
obtain the correct random indexes. The probability that the








The client can control the escape probability that the SP
passes the verification to be below a given threshold by ad-
justing r, i.e., the number of queries with challenge tokens.
According to the experiment results, an assurance level of
5% escape probability requires the client to prepare 25%
queries with challenge tokens.
Xie et al. [76] proposed a probabilistic verification frame-
work to check the soundness, completeness and freshness
of the query results on outsourced encrypted databases. It
is worth noting that the authentication approach in [76] also
can protect data privacy as it is applied on the encrypted
data. The key idea is that the client creates a small set of fake
tuples ∆, and inserts ∆ into the original database D. The
SP processes queries over the database with ∆, assuming
it cannot distinguish real tuples from the fake ones. The
correctness of a query result RQ is evaluated by checking
if the returned result RS contains Q(∆), where Q(∆) is the
results of evaluatingQ on ∆. If it does not, the client believes
that the results violates the correctness requirement with
100% certainty. Otherwise, the client trusts the correctness of
RS with a probability. Formally, assume the original dataset
D has N tuples, and K fake tuples are inserted into D.





K + (N − i)
The empirical study in [76] shows that for a dataset of N =
1, 000, 000 tuples, when the fake tuples are more than 10%
of the original data, and more than 50 tuples are deleted, it
is close to impossible for the attacker to escape from being
caught by the probabilistic approach.
In the reasoning of probabilistic guarantee, the authors
only consider tuple deletion since tuple modification or
insertion can be easily detected through the following data
authentication. Before outsourcing, the data owner inserts
a special digest value for each (real/fake) tuple. For any
tuple t = {tid, a1, . . . , am}, where tid is the unique tuple
identifier, the digest is calculated as
h(t) =
{
H(tid⊕ a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ am) if t is real
H(tid⊕ a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ am) + 1 if t is fake
(6)
On receiving any tuple t from the SP, the client can tell if
it is a real or fake tuple from the digest value. The way to
generate digest values facilitates efficient data update oper-
ation, as the digest of new tuples can be readily calculated
at the client side.
Di Vimercati et al. [24], [26] applied the probabilistic
authentication method to join queries. The outsourcing
framework considers the join of two relations, Bl and Br
hosted at two storage SPs Sl and Sr. The integrity guarantee
of Bl on Br is verified by using three types of fake tuples
inserted into the outsourced dataset: (1) markers tuples in-
serted to both Bl and Br ; (2) twins tuples, which are a
portion of real records that each of the storage SPs duplicates
locally before sending it to the SP; (3) salts/buckets tuples that
are inserted to destroy recognizable frequencies of combina-
tions in one-to-many joins. Salts are used on the tuples at
the many-side of the join so that occurrences of a same value
become distinct. Meanwhile the salted replicas are created
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at one-side of the join to create the corresponding matching.
Bucketization allows multiple occurrences of the same (en-
crypted) value at the many-side of the join, requiring that all
the values have the same number of occurrences. The client
can verify the result correctness regarding the markers and
twins. The probability that no marker is omitted is (1− of )m,
where f is the cardinality of a relation with t twin pairs
and m markers, and o is the number of original tuples that
are omitted without being detected. The probability that for
each twin pair, either both tuples are omitted or both are
preserved is (1− 2 of + 2( of )2)t.
6.2 Interactive Proof based Verification
Yupeng Zhang et al. [81] designed vSQL, a system for verifi-
able SQL queries over dynamic outsourced databases. vSQL
combines two different approaches, namely information-
theoretic interactive proof system [23] and a novel scheme
for verifiable polynomial delegation that can provide auxil-
iary inputs for the proof. vSQL first translates SQL queries
as arithmetic circuits. Then it relies on an information-
theoretic interactive proof system named the CMT protocol
[23], which allows a client to verify that y = C(x), where
x is the clients data, and C is a circuit corresponding to the
clients query. However, it is not feasible to apply the CMT
protocol directly since the client may not be able to store the
data x (i.e., the input database). To address this problem,
vSQL designs a new polynomial-delegation protocol, which
allows the client to be able to evaluate a certain multivariate
polynomial px that depends on x (but not on C) at a random
point. In particular, the data owner treats the database D
as an array of |D| elements, and computes the multi-linear
extension D′ of D. The data owner uses the polynomial-
delegation protocol to generate the commitment com of D′,
and sends com to the client and sends D to the SP. At the
query evaluation phase, the client verifies the query result
following the CMT protocol. The verification of all layers
except the last one follows the CMT protocol between the
client and the SP. In the last step of the CMT protocol, it has
to evaluate at a random point of D′ that is picked by the
SP. Since the client does not have access to D′, it verifies the
last step by using the commitment com via the polynomial-
delegation protocol. Since the point of the last step is not
the same as used for all previous steps, vSQL only provides
a non-deterministic guarantee of the query results. If the
result returned by the SP is incorrect, the client will reject it
with overwhelming probability.
6.3 Dealing with Data Updates
The checkpoint-based methods can deal with data updates
efficiently. The data owner can choose new checkpoints in
the updated records. The digest values of these new check-
point records can be readily calculated at the client side. The
interactive-proof based method [81] supports efficient data
updates by separating the computation of the update from
its verification. The SP has to update the digest com. The
client can provably evaluate if com is updated by using the
polynomial-delegation scheme.
6.4 Discussion
The existing checkpoint-based approaches have different
assumptions of the SP. [68] requires that the SP to be aware
of the verification protocol. [76] relaxes the assumption and
makes the verification approach to be transparent to the SP.
The SP is not required to be involved in the verification
protocol at all. This reduces the computational overhead by
the SP. According to the empirical study of [76], the fake
tuple based approach [76] incurs much cheaper verification
setup overhead at the data owner side than the challenge
token based approach [68] and MHT tree based determin-
istic approach [57]. However, the computational cost at the
SP side by the fake tuple based approach [76] can be higher
than the two aforementioned approaches, due to the large
number of inserted fake tuples to achieve high probabilistic
guarantee.
The alternative interactive proof based approach [81]
aims to make the expensive theoretical interactive proof sys-
tem to be practical. Compared with the generic verification
approaches [17], [33], it leads to a significant performance
speedup at the SP side. Its performance is also compara-
ble to a deterministic approach [82] that only supports a
restricted subclass of SQL queries.
7 FRESHNESS AUTHENTICATION
Most of the works discussed so far only consider the
verification of soundness and completeness of the query
results. In this section, we review the existing studies on
verification of freshness of the query results, i.e., these
results are obtained by executing the queries over the most
up-to-date data. Similar to the verification of soundness
and completeness, the freshness verification methods can be
classified into deterministic and probabilistic approaches.
Deterministic approaches. A straightforward solution is
to extend the proof-based solutions to provide freshness
verification. The key challenge of such extension is to en-
sure that the signatures attached to individual tuples are
indeed constructed from the most up-to-date data. Then the
client can verify the freshness of the query results from the
constructed proof of the query results in the similar way
as the existing proof-based methods, as long as the proof
is constructed from the up-to-date signatures, for example,
either by aggregated signature or by the tree-based ADS.
Li et al. [44] first raises the issue of query freshness. They
provide a number of solutions, including publishing a list of
revoked signatures, including the time interval of validity
as part of the signed message and reissuing the signature
after the interval expires, and using hash chains to confirm
validity of signatures at frequent intervals. They point out
that any of these approaches can be applied directly on
the tree-based solutions to update the single signature of
the root of the tree. Each data update will require re-
issuing one signature only. Xie et al. [77] designs a scheme
that associates the signature St (e.g., the aggregated signa-
ture or the root signature of MHT tree) with a certificate
CertificateCA(St, t) in the outsourced database, to indicate
that the current signature at time t is St. When a client
retrieves the query result, it also retrieves the signature and
verifies if it is for timestamp t. Pang et al. [59] combined
signature chaining with timestamps. The key idea is that the
timestamps are embraced into the calculation of hash values
of tuples. Thus the signature of a tuple ti is calculated as
σi = sign(H(i||ti||ti−1||ti.ts)), where sign() is a signature
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function (e.g. RSA [66]),H() is a collision-free hash function,
and ti−1 is the immediate left neighbor of ti along an
ordering attribute, and ts denotes the timestamp of the last
update for tuple ti. Based on the this signature scheme, the
proof is constructed in the similar way as [53]. The proof
can be used to verify authenticity, soundness, completeness,
and freshness.
Probabilistic approaches. The key challenges to extend the
checkpoint-based authentication methods to support fresh-
ness verification are as follows. First, the client must know
what are the most up-to-date fake tuples in the outsourced
database. This means that the client must be aware of all
insertions and deletions of the fake tuples starting from
the beginning. Second, it is important to ensure the fake
tuple based scheme is provably secure, i.e., the attacker
cannot distinguish fake operations from real operations.
To address these challenges, [77] devise a mechanism to
make all fake operations deterministic so that the client can
derive the latest status of the fake tuples in the outsourced
database. Specifically, the fake operations scheme is defined
as (FS, T,H), where FS is a set of functions to generate the
fake tuples, T is a function to decide when to submit the fake
operations and H is a function to decide when a function in
FS is used to create fake tuples. The paper shows that the
scheme is a provably secure scheme whose security can be
reduced to the underlying encryption primitives.
8 QUERY AUTHENTICATION WITH OTHER SECU-
RITY FEATURES
Other security goals can be considered in parallel with
query authentication in the DaaS framework. For example,
how to efficiently authenticate query results without violat-
ing access control policies, and how to verify the integrity
of results on privacy-preserving query evaluation. In this
section, we review the existing works that integrate query
integrity authentication with other security features.
8.1 Integrity and Privacy
Sarvjeet Singh et al. [67] consider a two-party scenario,
in which the data owner has a private database, and the
external querier would like to obtain some information from
the private database by sending the queries to the data
owner. The external querier desires to obtain a proof that
shows the results returned by the database owner indeed
reflect the correct evaluation of the submitted query over
an uncorrupted version of the database. On the other hand,
the data owner does not reveal any private information to
the querier except the query results. The goal is to design a
query authentication method for private databases, aiming
to minimize the amounts of data revealed to the untrusted
third party, except the query results. The paper included
several solutions with various degrees of privacy, computa-
tional complexity and data bandwidth. The recommended
solution is to use Merkle tree for query authentication. The
key idea is that the data owner constructs a Merkle tree, and
sends the query results with a proof constructed from the
Merkle tree. This can preserve database privacy as it reveals
only the hashes of tuples that are not part of the result. The
integrity of query results is verified by reconstructing the
root signature of the hash tree, similar to [25].
Wang et al. [73] consider a three-party scenario that
contains the data owner, the SP, and the client who is not
necessarily to be the data owner. To protect the private data
from the untrusted SP, the data is encrypted by the methods
that support encrypted queries over encrypted databases. To
provide query verification guarantee, they design a novel
encryption method called Dual Encryption. The key idea
of dual encryption is to encrypt the entire data D using
a primary encryption key k, and encrypt a selected, small
subset of D using a secondary encryption key k′. The two
encrypted datasets are merged and stored at the SP as a
single dataset. The purpose of dual encryption is to allow for
sophisticated cross examination on query results. Assume a
client has a batch of queries Q = {q1, . . . , qu}. For each
query qi ∈ Q, the client sends its encrypted query qki to the










identical (i.e., they return the same set of records). The client
analyzes both ρ(qki ) and ρ(q
k′
i ) by checking if for each repli-
cated tuple t ∈ ρ(qki ), t also appears in ρ(qk
′
i ). To help iden-
tify how the tuples are encrypted, the data owner attaches
dual information to each record, which is generated by secret
key and one-way hashing. Regarding the security guarantee
of the dual encryption schemes, the authors investigated
two possible attacks, namely the query correspondence attack
and the distribution attack. The query correspondence attack
considers the case that if an adversary can find out that two
encrypted queries ρ(qki ) and ρ(q
k′
i ) are indeed semantically
identical, it can break the verification. To defend against this
attack, the dual encryption scheme is revised by requiring
that ρ(qki ) and ρ(q
k′
i ) should not be identical but indeed
have certain overlap. The distribution attack considers an
adversary who may discover data correspondence with high
probability by studying the distribution of query results.
The solution to defend against this attack is to issue the
checking query based on the answer size of the query to
be verified. Only when the answer size is large enough the
checking query can be issued.
8.2 Integrity and Data Confidentiality
Pang et al. [57] is the first work that considers query au-
thentication with the respect of the access control policy.
They consider the completeness verification for selection-
projection queries, with the assumption that the original
selection-projection query has been re-written as a new
selection-projection query. The challenge is to make sure
that during the construction of completeness proof, the left
and right boundaries of the query results that are used for
VO do not violate the access control policy. To address this
challenge, the data owner inserts two fictitious entries, a left
delimiter r0 ∈ (L,U) and a right delimiter rn+1 ∈ (L,U)
into D. The two fictitious entries ensures that the boundary
records used in the proof do not violate the access control
policy. For completeness verification, the digital signature
of the real tuples in the query results are constructed. While
for the two delimiters, their signatures are constructed by




Based on the signatures, the completeness verification is
performed in the similar way as in [58].
Kundu et al. [43] consider the scenario that the data
organization structures encode sensitive information (such
as in XML documents). The goal is to provide both integrity
and confidentiality not only for the content, but also for
the structure. The concept of confidentiality is interpreted
as requiring a user to receive only those nodes and the
structural information that the user is allowed to access,
according to the stated access control policies. A user should
not receive nor should be able to infer any information about
the content and presence of nodes and structural informa-
tion that the user is not authorized to access. Based on this,
[43] formally defined the concept of structure confidentiality.
The aim is to enable an user to authenticate a subtree S
from a tree T without leaking any other nodes from TS (
refers to the cut operation). They designed a novel concept
called structural signature, which is based on the structure of
the tree defined by tree traversals - postorder, pre-order and
in-order. In particular, the structural signature of a node x
in tree T consists of a hash of the structural position, the
content of x, and the (salted) signature of the tree, where
the structural position of a node is defined as a pair of
randomized post-order (RPON) and randomized pre-order
(RRON). To share the tree with a third-party that has the
authorization to access the subtree Sz , Sz can be shared
according to two different strategies: (1) by sharing the
signed subtree - its nodes and the structure or (2) by sharing
the signed nodes in the subtree and letting the third-party
reconstruct the subtree using the RPONs and RRONs of the
nodes. The authors considered both options for integrity
verification, with the same goal as building the correct
signature of the tree to show correctness. They provide
the security analysis which shows the structural signatures
do not lead to any leakage of (1) node signatures, and
information about the (2) existence of nodes, (3) structural
relations or (4) structural order among nodes.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this survey, we reviewed the existing studies on in-
tegrity authentication of SQL query evaluation for the DaaS
paradigm. We categorize these works by how the verifi-
cation is performed and the integrity guarantee that these
works can achieve. There exists the trade-off between the
integrity guarantee and the performance of the verifica-
tion methods. The deterministic integrity guarantee can
be achieved but with possibly expensive setup cost and
verification overhead; such overhead can be improved by
relaxing the integrity guarantee to be probabilistic.
In the rest of this section, we discuss several interesting
directions for the future work.
9.1 Authentication of Query Evaluation on Big Data
The three well-known properties of Big data is 3Vs (volume,
variety and velocity). Volume refers to the amount of data,
variety refers to the number of types of data and velocity
refers to the speed of data processing. The three properties
raise different challenges to the authentication of query eval-
uation. The big data volume requires that the authentication
methods must be scalable; the setup and verification should
not add significant overhead on query evaluation itself.
The fast velocity requires that the authentication methods
must support frequent updates efficiently. The large variety
requires that the authentication methods should be able to
support various data types. A naive method is to construct
an ADS for each data type, and thus a proof for each data
type too. But this may bring overwhelming verification
overhead. An interesting research direction that worths to
explore is how to address the challenges of volume, variety
and velocity of Big data for the design of efficient and
scalable authentication solutions.
MapReduce has emerged as an important computational
model for data intensive applications. The MapReduce in-
frastructure consists of two primitives: (a) a map function
that distributes the input to multiple mapper nodes to
generate intermediate key-values in parallel, and (b) a reduce
function that allows multiple reducer nodes to merge the
intermediate pairs associated with the same key and then
to generate the final outputs. Intuitively, all mappers and
reducers can be compromised and return wrong intermedi-
ate and/or final results. Therefore, cloud-based query eval-
uation raises two main challenge: (1) how to authenticate
the query results in the format of key-value pairs; and (2)
how to authenticate both the intermediate and final results
for MapReduce execution. A few papers have considered
integrity verification of MapReduce execution [34], [71], [74].
Intuitively, the intermediate results can be authenticated by
applying the existing solutions on each mapper. However,
this requires to construct an ADS independently for each
mapper, which can be extremely expensive. The main chal-
lenge is how to address the verification overhead issue for
the query results in a distributed fashion. In particular, how
to construct the ADS to support efficient verification of both
intermediate query results by the mappers and final query
results by the reducers.
9.2 Authentication for Various Outsourcing Paradigms
In general, the outsourcing paradigms can be classified into
three types:
• Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) paradigm: the data
owner can deploy and run arbitrary software includ-
ing operating systems and applications. The SP pro-
vides the computing infrastructure, e.g., data storage
and hardware for the computation. A typical IaaS
example is Amazon EC2 Web Service [1].
• Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) paradigm: The SP deliv-
ers a computing platform, typically including oper-
ating system, execution environment, database, and
web server. Some well-known PaaS offers include
Microsoft Azure [10] and Google Cloud SQL [4].
• Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) paradigm: The clients use
the SP’s applications running on an outsourced in-
frastructure (e.g., the cloud). The applications are
accessible from various client devices through either
a thin client interface, such as a web browser (e.g.,
web-based email), or a program interface.
Different computational paradigms bring different chal-
lenges of authentication. For example, compared with the
IaaS paradigm, the SP of Paas and SaaS paradigms has
more cheating power on the computations, as the client has
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neither knowledge of the computations nor how these com-
putations are configured and executed. Therefore, the verifi-
cation of result integrity for the SaaS and PaaS paradigms is
more challenging, especially for those computations whose
outputs highly depend on the setup of the computations
(e.g., the initial centroids of k-means clustering [46]).
9.3 Authentication of Various Types of Outsourced
Computations
This survey focuses on SQL query evaluation only. In prac-
tice, the outsourcing paradigm provides a broader range of
data analytics services, ranging from simple aggregation to
Web search to sophisticated data mining and learning, to
name a few. Below we present a few examples of outsourced
computations, and discuss the challenges and potential
research directions for the verification of these types of
outsourced computations.
Keyword search on Web. Web search engines are typical
outsourced computations. The search service providers may
return incorrect search results due to various reasons (e.g.,
to make profits from advertisements) [35]. Furthermore, the
service providers may return the results in a wrong ranking
(e.g., to promote some websites). Therefore, the authenti-
cation goals are two-fold: (1) to verify that the returned
keyword search results are sound, complete, and fresh, and
(2) to verify the ranking of the returned results is accurate.
[35], [55] have initiated the research on authentication of
soundness, completeness, and freshness of the Web-search
content. How to verify the ranking of the results is still
unsolved. Verification of top-k query evaluation has been
studied under different contexts, e.g., for sensor networks
[80] and location-based services [19]. It will be interesting to
explore if these top-k query authentication methods can be
adapted to keyword search queries.
Outsourced data mining and machine learning. Big cor-
porations like Amazon, Google and Microsoft are providing
cloud-based data mining and learning services in various
forms. Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides computation
capacity and data storages via Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) [1] and Simple Storage Service (S3) [2]. Google
provides cloud machine learning engines [3] for various
machine learning applications, including customer purchase
prediction and spam detection, to name a few. Microsoft
provides big data analytics services on Windows Azure
cloud [10]. This raises the issue of how to evaluate the
result integrity of these outsourced machine learning com-
putations. There are several interesting research questions.
First, can any existing ADS structure (e.g. MB-tree [44] and
VB-tree [58]) be adapted to the authentication solutions
for outsourced machine learning and data mining com-
putations? Second, given the high complexity of machine
learning computations, the deterministic approach may not
be appropriate as it can bring expensive overhead. On the
other hand, it is not straightforward how to adapt the exist-
ing probabilistic approaches [76] to the outsourced machine
learning computations, since inserting some fake tuples can
change the machine learning results (e.g., classification and
clustering) of the original data. The challenge is how to
design those fake tuples for authentication while keeping
the original data analytics results unchanged. The existing
authentication solutions include various types of data min-
ing computations, including association rule mining [27],
[28], [29], outlier mining [30], [48], clustering [46], Bayesian
network construction [47], and collaborative filtering [70],
[72]. Many of these solutions (e.g. [46], [47], [48]) consider
the probabilistic approaches. One of the weaknesses of
these approaches is that they may be vulnerable against the
attacker who is aware of the authentication mechanism, in
particular, how the fake data points are constructed. Then
the attacker can distinguish the fake data points from the
real ones. An interesting research direction is to design
robust probabilistic verification methods that can address
the trade-off between efficiency and the robustness of the
authentication methods.
Spatial query evaluation. A large body of work has
considered query evaluation on spatial databases (e.g. [39],
[40], [41], [62], [79]). The goal of authentication is to verify
if the returned locations satisfy the given constraints (e.g.,
within a range, one of the nearest neighbor, etc.). The
main challenge of spatial query authentication is how to
compute the distances efficiently for verification. Various
techniques (e.g., Voronoi diagram and R-trees) are used to
represent the underlying spatial data set. The remaining
technical issues to be resolved is how to design efficient,
online authentication methods that can deal with dynamic
location data that are updated frequently. This requires
that the authentication methods can support fast updates
on the ADS, quick construction of the proof of the query
results, and cheap verification at the client side who may
use resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones for
verification.
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